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OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSALS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO CHANGE THE PERSONNEL OF THE JUDGES
RUBY R. VALE*
Article 3 Section 1 of the Federal Constitution is the tendon of Achilles of
the American system-of government and also may be its safety valve. The duty
to create a Supreme Court and inferior Federal courts necessarily includes the
control over the judges through whom the judiciary functions. The performance
of this duty is imposed on the Congress and the President and they also are invested
with the incidental powers to confer jurisdiction, to define the judicial function
and to fix the number of judges. The President, with the consent of the Senate,
names the judges. Lord Bryce refers to the failure of the Constitution "to determine
the number of judges in the Supreme Court" as "a weak point, a joint in the
court's armor through which a weapon might some day penetrate." It is this dual
legislative and executive power to create the courts and to determine the number
and perso iel of the judges that in full understanding and proper exercise has
made a free and independent judiciary; and figuratively, is the tendon which maintains the equilibrium of justice and sustains the weight of order as administered
under our dual Federal and State governments. But this vital tendon is exposed
to the possibility that executive dominance over a subservient Congress may
atrophy or cut it, with resultant collapse of equilibrium and the executive becoming
the dominant authority in government and in its administration of justice.
The reason our government is so delicately balanced and the administration
of justice so sensitive to change is because its structure is defined, its mechanism is
determined, the tights of the people are protected and the limitations on the functions of its organs are imposed by a written constitution whose words of general
import must be given ultimate meaning by a human tribunal. The mechanism
of our government and its principles of constitutional law are in a constant state
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of flux and of becoming and both reflect in their evolution not only the variant
political and economic conditions but also the minds, characters and environments
of the judges that give meaning to the Constitution and apply it to changing conditions. They then are the real arbiters of government and of law under our Constitution who on final appeal speak last in the judicial understanding of its vital
written words and in its application to new conditions.
It is clear that with statutory change in the personnel of the Supreme Court
and with consequent constitutional change of interpretation, (i.e., when the
prior.interpretation gives definition to uncertainty or sustains a statute of doubtful
constitutionality or condemns a statute that clearly offends the Constitution) the
last interpretation is not in the nature of an amendment to the Constitution but
rather is declaratory of the Constitution; and this because neither interpretation is
purposive by giving a meaning now different from that when first written or
arbitrary by not applying that meaning now as then to similar situations, but both
interpretations are the conscientious opinions of independent and oath-regardful
judges. When, however, the Congress, at the request of the President, creates
new judges for the avowed purpose of sustaining as constitutional legislation
similar to that which the Supreme Court heretofore in proper discharge of its
functions had stricken down as unconstitutional, then the statutory increase in
the number of judges and their change of meaning or of the application of the
words of the Constitution is not interpretation but in fact and effect is an amendment to the Constitution, because made for that avowed purpose.
The essentials of a representative democracy are that the people shall ordain
a fundamental law which establishes a government with sovereignty vested in the
popular will, exercised for the general welfare and which functions through agents.
There can be no democracy with representation without either the traditional
assent of the people or, after referendum to them, their original adoption or
subsequent amendment of a constitution.
The unwritten constitution of England may be amended by act of Parliament
or by judicial interpretation of the House of Lords, but by either only if and
when sustained by public opinion. There is reserved always to the people of
England the power of repeal by subsequent Parliament and to nullify constitutional
interpretation of the House of Lords by the creation of new Lords.
While amendments may be made to the written Constitution of the
United States in four different ways, each of the methods makes the approval or
ratification by the people a fundamental essential of constitutional change. The
executive in effect may write into our Constitution a basal principle declaratory of
human relations only if it is universally accepted as true because founded on obvious or admitted fact, as when former President Theodore Roosevelt declared the
consuming public to be a third party in interest to all disputes between capital
and labor. The two-third requirement to propose and the three-fourth vote of
the legislators or of the conventions for the approval of amendments make dear
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that under the two formal methods constitutional amendments must be the seasoned
judgment of the American states and of the people.
The people through their representatives in Congress and the President in
theory have two checks on judicial usurpation. They may impeach and remove
the offending judges or they may amend the Constitution formally or declare it
through interpretation by additional judges created by Congress after referendum
to the people for the purpose of sustaining legislation deemed by them as essential
under the Constitution for the general welfare, but which the judges as instrumentalities of judicial action arbitrarily have struck down. It is possible for a
minority of the States and people not only long to delay but finally to prevent
formal amendment to the Constitution as construed by an arbitrary Supreme
Court which persists in nullifying the popular will. Judicial usurpation in the
nature of a stubborn determination arbitrarily to thwart legislation deemed constitutional by the executive, by a majority of Congress and by a majority of the
people on referendum even if made a count in impeachment proceedings is so
difficult of proof as to make improbable conviction and removal of the offending
judges. It would then seem that the only remedy under the Constitution which
a majority of the States and people have against the usurpation of judges by
arbitrary persistent and wrongful interpretation, is the creation by the people
through their representatives in Congress and the President of new judges with
different attitudes of mind and new concepts of life relations. It is this safety
valve which the fathers in wisdom provided as the alternative to violent revolution
and by which a growing and ever expanding Constitution may be vitalized by
adapting it to new conditions and relations, with identity of meaning and
certainty of its application to situations now as when ordained by the people.
In the knowledge of the nature of the attacks made on the Supreme Court
because of its decision in three leading cases, each of which involved property
interests of magnitude (e.g., a deliberate conspiracy to protect property in slaves,
the creation and appointment of new judges sympathetic to legalizing fiat money,
and the reversal of opinion of a judge on arbitrary reargument to prevent the
imposition of income taxes), it cannot be said that such always has been or
will be the personnel of the judges and so impeccant their judicial :acts, either of
method or of decision, as to preclude the fact or the probability or the suspicion
that the arbitrary will of a judge or unworthy personal motives or public considerations other than of justice, have thwarted or will thwart the popular will
by declaring unconstitutional statutes which a dominant majority believe to be
constitutional.
The President grounds the instant proposals to increase the number of
judges of the Supreme Court on three propositions: (1) That the advanced age
of some of the sitting judges burdens and delays the administration of justice;
and (2) the assumption that because of the inclination of age to cling to the old
the elder judges purposively have declared by arbitrary interpretation a Constitution
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contrary to the President's conception of its meaning, which conception (3) he
further assumes is in exact coincidence with the Constitution as understood by the
great mass of the people whose mandate he has to make new judges that his
conception of the Constitution shall prevail.
It did not require the conclusive statement of the Chief Justice to demonstrate
the diligence and competency of the Supreme Court and to induce a discerning
public to suspect that the imputation of its delay might be a subterfuge to mask a
deeper purpose fraught with peril to the continuance under the Constitution of
representative democracy.
The President's assumptions that the Supreme Court by arbitrary interpretation
has usurped the people's prerogative and wrongfully has amended the Constitution
and that he, without antecedent referendum to the people, holds their mandate to
repeal its (to him) odious judicial amendments, is in truth the feared sword that
may cut the Achilles tendon of American constitutional government.
However divergent the respective understandings of the Supreme Court and
the President as to constitutional limitations and however many the citizens are
who accept the President's assumptions, there are many more millions of Americans
who repudiate them because of their confidence in the integrity of the courts and
in the loyalty of the judges to their oaths to maintain the Constitution as their
minds understand and their consciences apply its limitations to Federal and State
legislation. It is this admitted diversity of opinion on this momentous issue that
makes it imperative for the President to submit to the people the question of the
truth of his factual assumption of judicial usurpation by purposive and arbitrary
interpretation if he would avoid the suspicion or escape the condemnation of
making proposals in studied disregard of the people's prerogative by their act to
change their Constitution.
The national platform of the Democratic party and, during his canvass, the
President repeatedly declared for formal amendment as the remedy against the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Neither the President nor
any of his supporters charged the Supreme Court or any of its judges with arbitrary
interpretation in nullification of the people's will as embodied in any statute. The
President at no time in his public life ever suggested the use by the people of
their power to change the personnel of the Court in relief of alleged judicial
usurpation, but repeatedly disavowed such method as a remedy and many of his
opponents accepted his remedy of formal amendment as the promise of a sincere
and honorable President and refrained from charging him with the revolutionary
purpose embodied in the proposals which he now asks Congress to adopt at its
first session after his election.
It is the full and complete form of his proposals, the precipitate haste of
their presentation, the subtle nature of their coercion on the elder -judges and the
political sagacity of his request for immediate congressional enactment without
referendum to the people, that give substance to the fear of an ulterior and sinister
purpose to mold an emasculated judiciary to his will preparatory to and as the
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one essential of executive mastery under the shadow of constitutional forms.
The power that makes the courts can unmake American representative
democracy. If the President can persuade or coerce the present Congress to accept
as truth his unwarranted assumptions and to enact into law his revolutionary proposals, he will have usurped the people's prerogative to change the Constitution and
can make himself the supreme power in the Nation. Thus the President may
make use of a constitutional remedy aimed against judicial usurpation and a safety
valve against violent revolution to destroy the ultimate sovereignty of the people.
It is submitted that the proposals of the President imperil our representative
democracy because in denial of the people's fundamental prerogative. They are
founded upon the error of a dangerous, because false in fact and of revolutionary
effect, assumption that the people have given him a mandate against the judicial
usurpation of upright judges whose only offense is that in good conscience they
could not declare the Constitution as understood by the President or apply it as he
desired.
It is suggested that an- independent judiciary as an essential organ of representative democracy under the Constitution can yet be saved by the President and
by the Congress. There are sufficient liberals in this Congress forthwith to authorize
the submission to the people of carefully worded constitutional amendments
remedial of what by them and the President is conceived as erroneous constitutional
interpretation and meanwhile to stay congressional action on the proposal to change
the personnel of the Supreme Court until after the next congressional elections. If
this is done then will go to the people under constitutional referendum the issues
vital to representative democracy and to the supremacy of the people under the
Constitution.
One-third of the States have now permanent statutes which permit action
immediately upon submission of the amendments and the required number to
adopt can act on the amendment before such elections. Whether the amendments
are adopted or not, if the elected representatives of the people so will, Congress
and the President by statute may then change the personnel of the Supreme Court
without offending the letter of the Constitution, whatever the violence to its
spirit, and this because after referendum the statute is in accord with and gives
effect to the will of the people and under the American system of jurisprudence
their mandate cannot be wrong either legally or morally or as the policy of
the Nation.
In final analysis then the issue involved in this controversy is factual, and as
that fact is found, the statutory change in the personnel of the Supreme Court by
this Congress may be enacted with or without breach of the fundamental law. The
President does not avow an explicit mandate from the people to increase the
number of judges of that court. Is he warranted in basing his assumption of
the people's implied mandate to do this revolutionary thing on his vague and tenuous promise to use every legal method to correct the alleged errors of the
Supreme Court? Has this assumption by implication the justification of good
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faith when in truth the President expressly characterized as "unthinkable" his
disavowal of a purpose to pack the Supreme Court, and his supporters then condemned as "fantastic" the suggestion to increase its members?
In the recollection that he stated in the language of his party platform the
alleged wrongful interpretation should be cured by formal amendment to the
Constitution, may the President be permitted now to assume that he has the real
and true mandate of the people to make a vital change in their Constitution; have
the people indeed, after free discussion and in full understanding of the exercise
of their sovereign power, deliberately decreed that the whim or want of a selfaggrandizing congressional majority henceforth shall be the only determinant of
what is constitutional and shall it be the sole judge of the rights and liberties which
a people originally had ordained as inalienable and forever within guardian
keeping of the Supreme Court?
The question now for the decision of Congress is the most momentous that
can confront a people for it involves not only the constitutional fabric of a nation
but in deeper significance the usurpation of the power which gives life, energy and
purpose to the sovereign will of the people. The present Congress may increase
the number of judges of the Supreme Court only if it believes (a) that the Court
arbitrarily has struck down constitutional statutes or, assuming the Court's conscientious performance of duty, (b) that the people have given to Congress authority
to change the Court's interpretation of the Constitution by changing its personnel.
Change of court personnel means more than mere change of a particular past
interpretation or of anticipating a new construction of the Constitution to meet
a future statute.
The conclusion is crystal clear and cannot be evaded that the acceptance
by Congress of the assumptions of the President means that the Constitution is no
longer the fundamental law of the people, but that the changing rule of Congress,
with its passions and its greeds, its prejudices and its creeds, has become the
supreme law of the land; that while a subservient judiciary may survive, constitutional limitations are destroyed; and that the Congress and the President may
now invade the powers of the states, may now impinge on the freedom of individual initiative, effort and enterprise and may now violate the basal principles of
American individualism and of equality before the law by modification or denial
of the fundamentals of liberty, of property, of worship and of justice as once
defined by the people in their Constitution.
It is hoped and here urged that the President in denial of the people's prerogative and by assumptions contrary to fact, may not prevail on the Congress to
impair the independence of the judiciary and thus weaken, if not destroy, representative democracy under the Constitution, and this to the end that the people
may continue to make the Constitution which defines the government and
determines the limitation under which they must live.
Philadelphia, Pa.
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